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From Asahi to WOTUS: Why “Significant Nexus”
Falls Short
Thomas J. Philbrick 
In 2012, California farmer John Duarte was fined $1 million by the
federal government for plowing his own field. The government claimed
that seasonal water gatherings on certain parts of his land made it a
regulatable water even though the land had been Duarte’s farmland for
over two decades. This series of events was only possible because of the
Clean Water Act’s (CWA) definition of what constitutes a regulatable
water.
The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants from any point source
into navigable waters of the United States (WOTUS) without a permit. On 
June 29, 2015, the Obama administration determined that a body of water
is a WOTUS subject to CWA regulation if it has a “significant nexus” to
a navigable water. The Trump administration recently replaced the 2015
rule with a revised rule that limits the government’s jurisdictional reach.
The WOTUS definition has always been controversial. Multiple
Supreme Court cases have revolved around it, and legislators and
scholars continually debate the proper scope of the term. While a
significant amount of scholarship has focused on the relationship between
the WOTUS rule and the Commerce Clause, far less ink has been spilt on
the relationship between the WOTUS rule and the United States’ personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence. However, these personal jurisdiction cases
offer a helpful framework through which to analyze the WOTUS rule. They
suggest that the EPA’s current “significant nexus” test falls short of the
“clear connection” test from Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos
v. United States. This is because of the susceptibility of the “significant
nexus” standard to agency abuse and its lack of a legitimate statutory or
precedential basis.
In an effort to calm the murky waters of the WOTUS rule, this Note
provides a timely and in-depth analysis of the flaws in the “significant
nexus” test and additional support for the Trump administration’s
adoption of the “clear connection” test that will help courts and agencies
make better decisions and avoid burdening landowners.
Copyright 2021, by THOMAS J. PHILBRICK.
 Thomas Philbrick is a lawyer, writer, and violinist in Detroit, Michigan.
He holds a law degree from Michigan State University College of Law and a
bachelor's degree from Wheaton College (IL). He would like to extend his
appreciation to Michigan State University College of Law Professor Glen
Staszewski for his thoughtful advice throughout the drafting process.
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INTRODUCTION
When California farmer John Duarte plowed his fields to prepare for
planting in the spring of 2012, he did not expect to run into problems with
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1672021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
the federal government.1 However, after several years of litigation, Duarte
had to pay a $1 million fine for plowing his own fields.2 The government
claimed that seasonal water gatherings on certain parts of his land made it
regulatable water even though the land had been used as farmland for over
two decades.3 This series of events was only possible because of the Clean
Water Act’s (CWA) definition of what constitutes a regulatable water.4 
The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants from any point source
into navigable waters of the United States (WOTUS) without a permit.5 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforces the CWA in
consultation with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).6 The Obama administration 
redefined WOTUS on June 29, 2015, so that all wetlands adjacent to any
WOTUS became subject to the CWA permitting requirements.7 Whether
1. See Damon Arthur, He Plowed His Field; Now He Faces a $2.8 Million
Fine, USA TODAY (May 24, 2017, 7:07 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation-now/2017/05/24/farmer-plowing-fine/339756001/ [https://per
ma.cc/E43S-NTFD].
2. See The Clean Water Act’s 404(f) Exemptions, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY
(May 2, 2018), https://fedsoc.org/events/the-clean-water-act-s-404-f-exemptions
[https://perma.cc/V82U-32QV] (statement of Tyler G. Welti, Venable, LLP).
3. See Chris Bennett, When a Farmer Punches Back at the Feds, AGWEB
(May 1, 2017, 1:02 PM), https://www.agweb.com/article/when-a-farmer-punches
-back-at-the-feds-naa-chris-bennett/ [https://perma.cc/TC8G-2ZPV] (“Twenty
years of wheat production followed by 15 years of livestock production wasn’t a
continuous farming operation, according to DOJ.”).
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2018); see also Mark Latham, Rapanos v.
United States: Significant Nexus or Significant Confusion? The Failure of the
Supreme Court to Clearly Define the Scope of Federal Wetland Jurisdiction, in
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 5, 15 (L. Kinvin
Wroth ed., 2007), http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/files/2013/05/The-Supreme-Court-
and-the-Clean-Water-Act-5-Essays.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z32-SNWF] (“[T]he
significant nexus test is fraught with uncertainty, both in terms of application and
guidance, for those mired in the current muck of wetland jurisdictional
determinations after the Court’s inability in Rapanos to fashion a clearly
articulated majority view. That is, just what constitutes the necessary significant
nexus sufficient for either the Corps or EPA to assert jurisdiction over property 
owners’ wetlands?”).
5. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
6. Id.
7. See Sarah Everhart, The WOTUS Rule Applies in Maryland, MD. RISK
MGMT. EDUC. BLOG (Sept 18, 2018), https://www.agrisk.umd.edu/post/the-
wotus-rule-applies-in-maryland [https://perma.cc/3WAD-6AVN]; see also
Lawrence A. Kogan, US Food Security and Farmers’ Livelihoods at Stake in
“Waters of the US” Rule Rewrite, THE WLF LEGAL PULSE (Apr 20, 2017),
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  172 2/25/21  8:41 AM









   
 




    
  
 
     
   
   
 
   
 





     
    
 
    
    
    
   
   
 
 
   
 




      
           
  
168 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
a body of water is a WOTUS subject to CWA regulation is determined by
whether the water has a “significant nexus” to a navigable water.8 The 
Trump administration recently replaced the 2015 rule with a revised rule
that significantly limits the reach of the government in regulating
waterways.9 
The WOTUS definition has always been controversial.10 Multiple
Supreme Court cases have revolved around it, and legislators and scholars




8. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment) (defining a significant nexus as a place where the wetland
or the surrounding land “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity” of a navigable water); see also Brandon C. Smith, Note, Jurisdictional
Donnybrook: Deciphering Wetlands Jurisdiction After Rapanos, 73 BROOK. L.
REV. 337, 340 (2007) (arguing that the significant nexus standard leads to
“disparate outcomes and uncertainty” for private property owners); see also
Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection under the
Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a
Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 713 (1989) (“The issues of which
waters and which activities are subject to 404 regulation have been at the heart of 
most of the controversy surrounding the program. Geographic jurisdiction
concerns the scope of the Clean Water Act's intent to assert regulatory control
over all waters . . . .”).
9. See Katy Stech Perek, EPA Rolls Back Obama-Era Regulations on Clean
Water, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 12, 2019, 9:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/epa-
to-roll-back-obama-era-regulations-on-clean-water-11568300216
[https://perma.cc/XR8G-RWCC]; see also The Navigable Waters Protection
Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,257
(April 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3) [hereinafter New Rule]
(laying out four categories of waters that are considered “waters of the United
States”: “(1) The territorial seas, and waters which are currently used, or were
used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
including waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; (2) tributaries;
(3) Lakes and ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters; and (4) Adjacent
wetlands.”).
10. See Laura Gatz, Overview of the Army Corps and EPA Rule to Define 
“Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) and Recent Developments, CONG. RES.
SERV. (Oct. 22, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10125.pdf [https://perma
.cc/FE7W-JNPQ].
11. See William T. Gorton III, Continued Turbulence in “Waters of the
United States,” 10 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 237, 242 (2018)
(noting that significant litigation has followed the definition of WOTUS for most
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  173 2/25/21  8:41 AM








   
















   
  




       
    




     
        
    
   
 
      
       
  
 
1692021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
amount of scholarship has focused on the relationship between the
WOTUS rule and the Commerce Clause, far less ink has been spilled on
the relationship between the WOTUS rule and the United States’ personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence.12 However, these personal jurisdiction cases 
offer a helpful framework through which to analyze the WOTUS rule.
They suggest that the recently revised WOTUS rule is correct in replacing
the former “significant nexus” test with the “clear connection” test from
Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos v. United States.13 
In Part I, this Article describes the historical development of the 
WOTUS definition and the litigation that has arisen around it.14 Part II
contains a discussion of the foundational cases that comprise the United
States’ personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and an in-depth look at the key
concepts that have stemmed from them.15 Part III uses both the personal
jurisdiction and WOTUS precedent to argue that the WOTUS definition
must be defined narrowly in order to avoid several significant problems.16 
of its existence); Travis L. Schilling, Redefining the Waters of the United States:
Did Government Overreach Just Get Trumped?, 23 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 131, 133
(2018) (noting the contentious nature of the rule’s development); Nathan E.
Vassar, Within the Flood Plain? An Analysis of the New “Waters of the United
States” Rule in the Context of History and Existing Regulations, 46 TEX. ENVTL.
L. J. 1, 17 (2016) (cautiously promoting the significant nexus test); Thomas P.
Redick & Christopher Brooks, WOTUS Wars and Endangered Species: Where 
Will Farmers Find Their Legal High Ground?, 31 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall
2016, at 20, 23 (2016) (arguing that the significant nexus test will cause unfair
and unrealistic results for farmers); Samuel Worth, Water, Water, Everywhere,
and Plenty of Drops to Regulate: Why the Newly Published WOTUS Rule Does 
Not Violate the Commerce Clause, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 605 (2016).
12. Worth, supra note 11.
13. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 717 (2006) (noting that “only
those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of
the United States’ in their own right” are “adjacent” to other regulated waters and
therefore covered by the CWA).
14. See generally Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
15. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
16. See infra Part III; see also Jacob Arechiga, Redefining “Waters of the
United States” in the Trump Era, 48 TEX. ENVTL. L. J. 178, 179 (2018) (noting
that the regulatory framework has quietly but steadily “expanded over time” to
include more and more bodies of water).
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  174 2/25/21  8:41 AM








   
    
   
   







   
  
  
    
 
     
    
  
 
       
  
     
     
   
     
   
  





    
170 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
I. THE WOTUS STORY
The Clean Water Act was originally enacted in 1948 as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.17 The Act was amended in 1972 to become
the Clean Water Act (CWA), which prohibited pollutant discharges into
“navigable” waters without a permit.18 The CWA defined navigable waters
as “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”19 The CWA
delegated to the EPA and the Corps the authority to determine what
constituted “waters of the United States.”20 The Corps has interpreted the
phrase to include traditional navigable waters, tributaries of those waters,
and wetlands “adjacent” to such waters and tributaries.21 Adjacent
wetlands are those that are “bordering, contiguous [with], or neighboring”
a water of the United States.22 
A. A Tale of Two Pluralities
Waves of litigation followed the 1972 CWA amendments as interest
groups called for changes to the statute and clarity on what bodies of water
constituted “waters of the United States.”23 One example is the 1985 case
of United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., in which the
government sued a Michigan landowner for filling a wetland without a 
permit.24 The United States Supreme Court held that the definition of
“waters of the United States” included only those waters that “actually
17. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
18. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water
Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251– 
1388 (2018)).
19. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2018); see also Gatz, supra note 10 (noting that 
“[w]aters need not be truly navigable to be subject to CWA jurisdiction”).
20. Gatz, supra note 10.
21. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1), (a)(5), (a)(7) (2020).
22. Id. § 328.3(c).
23. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding that the CWA did not extend to the waters
in question because they were isolated, individual bodies of water that were not 
directly connected to a navigable water); U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121 (1985); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (holding that
the definition of “waters of the United States” include only those waters that
“actually abut[ted]” a traditionally navigable water); Baccarat Fremont 
Developers, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 425 F.3d 1150, 1152, 1157 (9th
Cir. 2005).
24. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124.
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  175 2/25/21  8:41 AM





    
 
   
   
  
     

















    
  
 
   
    
 
   
   
    
     
   
   
     
 
   
   
   
   
 
1712021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
abut[ted]” a traditionally navigable water.25 Another seminal case 
regarding the WOTUS definition is the 2001 case of Solid Waste Agency
of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in which a
group of municipal services in Chicago tried to build a landfill on a series
of lakes and wetlands.26 They were denied a CWA permit by the Corps.27 
The waste agency argued that the waters in question were not navigable
waters and that the term should be defined more narrowly.28 The Supreme
Court held that the CWA did not extend to the waters in question because
they were isolated, individual bodies of water that were not directly
connected to a navigable water.29 
However, the most important case regarding the WOTUS definition is
the 2006 case of Rapanos v. United States, which dealt with developer
John Rapanos’ unpermitted filling of a fifty-four acre wetland in order to 
build a shopping mall.30 After the EPA fined him thousands of dollars,
Rapanos challenged the agency’s interpretation of navigable waters in
court.31 The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the ruling 
against Rapanos but split evenly on the rationale for doing so.32 
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, stated that the
CWA applied only to wetlands that have a continuous surface connection
to bodies of water that are relatively permanent, such as streams, lakes, or
rivers.33 Scalia wrote that the definition of WOTUS included only those
waters that were “relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing
bodies of water.”34 He advanced four primary reasons for his conclusion.35 
First, Scalia looked at the natural and original definition of the term
“waters” and argued the Corps had extended the definition of WOTUS
beyond the plain language of the statute.36 Second, Scalia reasoned that
Supreme Court precedent established that isolated, non-navigable waters
25. Id. at 135.
26. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 162–63 (describing
the planned waste disposal site).
27. Id. at 165.
28. Id. at 168.
29. Id. at 171–72.
30. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 715 (2006).
31. Id. at 720.
32. Id. at 757.
33. Id. at 717 (noting that “only those wetlands with a continuous surface
connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right” are
“adjacent” to other regulated waters and therefore covered by the CWA).
34. Id. at 731.
35. Id. at 732.
36. Id. at 734 (“The plain language of the statute simply does not authorize
this ‘Land Is Waters’ approach to federal jurisdiction.”).
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  176 2/25/21  8:41 AM




   




    
  
   









   
    
 
 
     
  
 
    
 









    
 
   
 
      
  
   
172 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
were clearly not included in the definition of WOTUS.37 Third, Scalia
drew parallels from other areas of the CWA to support his conclusion.38 
For instance, he noted that the CWA defined intermittent and infrequent
flows of water under an entirely separate portion of the statute—not the
“navigable waters” portion.39 In addition, he noted that the phrase
“navigable waters,” which was adopted from previous versions of the
CWA, has traditionally been understood to only include discrete bodies of
water.40 Fourth, Scalia utilized a federalism rationale to argue that the
Corps’ WOTUS definition was far too expansive.41 He maintained that the
Corps’ excessively broad WOTUS definition would infringe upon the
power of the states to control their land and water usage.42 In this case,
there was no “clear and manifest” statement from Congress that would
authorize such an infringement of state authority.43 In short, Scalia felt that
the phrase “waters of the United States” included only those waters that
were relatively permanent and not those waters that contained merely
intermittent water flows.44 
37. Id. at 726; Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001) (holding that the CWA did not extend to the
waters in question because they were isolated, individual bodies of water that were
not directly connected to a navigable water).
38. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia seems to
have used a pseudo-Whole Act approach in this analysis. Id. Under this approach,
courts will interpret one part of a statute based on other parts of the same statute 
based on a presumption of statutory consistency.
39. Id. at 735 (the CWA itself includes intermittent flows of water under the
definition of point sources).
40. Id. at 734 (“In addition, the Act’s use of the traditional phrase ‘navigable
waters’ (the defined term) further confirms that it confers jurisdiction only over
relatively permanent bodies of water. The Act adopted that traditional term from
its predecessor statutes. On the traditional understanding, ‘navigable waters’
included only discrete bodies of water.”) (internal citations omitted).
41. Id. at 731; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (“It will be
of little avail to the people . . . if the laws be . . . so incoherent that they cannot be
understood . . . . Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule,
which is little known, and less fixed?”).
42. Id. at 737–38 (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at
174).
43. Id. (“We ordinarily expect a ‘clear and manifest’ statement from
Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state 
authority.”).
44. Id. at 739 (“[T]he phrase ‘the waters of the United States’ includes only those
relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water . . . [and] not .
. . channels through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally . . . .”).
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1732021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
Justice Kennedy’s solo concurring opinion, however, was more
expansive. Kennedy proposed a WOTUS definition that included any non-
navigable body of water—such as a wetland—that had a “significant
nexus” to a traditionally navigable water.45 This nexus existed, in Justice
Kennedy’s view, if the body of water “significantly affect[ed] the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of a navigable water.46 On the
other hand, if the water in question had only a minimal or “speculative”
impact on a navigable water, it was not a WOTUS and was not subject to
CWA regulation.47 
B. Response and Redefinition
Rapanos and its companions added to the uncertainty that existed
concerning the types of waters protected by the CWA.48 In response to
these cases, the EPA and the Corps redefined WOTUS by issuing a rule
on June 29, 2015.49 The rule began by stating that the CWA had
jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters, tributaries of traditional
navigable waters, and wetlands directly abutting traditional navigable
waters.50 Second, the rule determined that waters “adjacent” to traditional
navigable waters were within the WOTUS definition and were, therefore,
subject to CWA jurisdiction.51 A water was “adjacent” if it bordered or
neighbored a WOTUS and was separated from it by some sort of barrier.52 
Third, for any other body of water, the agencies had to conduct a case-
specific analysis in order to determine whether or not the body of water
had Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” to a traditionally navigable
45. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
46. Id. at 780.
47. Id. at 784.
48. Gatz, supra note 10.
49. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80
Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328); see also Kogan,
supra note 7.
50. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of ‘Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. 
Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328); see also Tim Stanis,
Drain the Swamps: A Brief History of “Waters of the United States” and the Trump 




51. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80
Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
52. Id.
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174 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
water.53 A “significant nexus” existed where the body of water in question 
significantly affected a body of water listed in the first or second
category.54 If a significant nexus existed, the water in question was a
WOTUS that fell under CWA jurisdiction.
Immediately after the rule was published, dozens of interest groups
filed lawsuits in federal courts around the country.55 Environmental
interest groups asked for more stringent protections of rivers and streams,
and agricultural interest groups worried that the significant nexus standard
would make it possible for the government to control even the smallest
farm drain.56 On August 27, 2015, the United States District Court of
North Dakota blocked the implementation of the new WOTUS rule in the
thirteen states who had initially challenged the 2015 rule.57 Two months
later, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a nationwide stay of the
WOTUS rule.58 
On February 28, 2017, President Donald Trump issued an executive
order withdrawing the 2015 WOTUS rule and revising it in accordance
53. Id. (stating that a significant nexus existed where the body of water in
question significantly affected a traditionally navigable water); see also Short
Summary of the WOTUS Rule, WATERS ADVOCACY COALITION 1–2 (2014),
https://www.nssga.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/WAC-Rule-Summary-4-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3P6-Z2GS]; see also Gatz, supra note 10.
54. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80
Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
55. See Clean Water Act, WOTUS, FB.ORG, 
https://www.fb.org/issues/regulatory-reform/clean-water-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/TM88-9TSP] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
56. Gatz, supra note 10; see also MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ENV’T &
PUB. WORKS, 114TH CONG., REP. ON THE EXPANSION OF JURISDICTION CLAIMED
BY THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND U.S. EPA UNDER THE CLEAN WATER
ACT 1–2 (2016), https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/7b469fe4-
62c3-4ea9-9ce2-bedbf5179372/wotus-committee-report-final1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ W2ZU-4UFH]; see also Laura Campbell, Waters of the United
States, MICH. FARM BUREAU, https://www.michfb.com/mi/wotus/ 
[https://perma.cc/D9ZU-L5ZE] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020); see also Pam




57. See Clean Water Act, WOTUS, supra note 55; see also Steve Kopperud,
Federal Judge Blocks WOTUS in 13 States; EPA Says it will Enforce for Rest of
Country, OHIO AGRIBUSINESS ASS’N, http://www.oaba.net/aws/OABA/pt/sd
/news_article/110970/_PARENT/layout_details/false [https://perma.cc/RA6H-H
BLK] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
58. See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2015).
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1752021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
with Justice Scalia’s Rapanos opinion.59 In National Association of
Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, the United States Supreme
Court lifted the nationwide stay on the implementation of the rule in
January 2018, holding that district courts—not courts of appeals—were 
the proper venue for lawsuits challenging the 2015 rule.60 On February 6,
2018, the EPA and the Corps delayed the implementation of the 2015 rule
for two years to facilitate redrafting.61 After a series of attempts to block
the rule by multiple federal district courts, the EPA and Corps proposed a
revised WOTUS definition on December 11, 2018.62 The result of this 
complicated web of procedural developments was that the 2015 WOTUS 
rule was only in effect in twenty-two states.63 Three different district court
injunctions covered the other twenty-eight states.64 
The Trump administration officially rolled back the 2015 WOTUS
rule on September 12, 2019.65 The administration implemented the revised 
rule on January 23, 2020, fulfilling the 2017 Executive Order66 and
limiting the government’s jurisdictional reach in water regulation.67 
59. See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 3 C.F.R. § 13778 (2018) [hereinafter
Executive Order].
60. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S.Ct. 617, 624 (2018)
(holding that lawsuits challenging the definition of WOTUS must be filed in
district courts).
61. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an
Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018).
62. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg.
4154 (Feb. 14, 2019) [hereinafter Revised Definition]; see also ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, FACT SHEET, PROPOSED REVISED DEFINITION OF “WATERS OF THE 
UNITED STATES”, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-12/doc
uments/factsheet_-_wotus_revision_overview_12.10_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK
4V-VT3R] [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (“This proposal clearly limits ‘waters of the
United States’ under the Clean Water Act to those that are physically and
meaningfully connected to traditional navigable waters.”).
63. Gatz, supra note 10; see also Ellen Essman, WOTUS Lawsuits Continue 
to Trickle Through Federal Courts, OHIO ST. U. FARM OFF. BLOG (June 6, 2019),
https://farmoffice.osu.edu/blog/thu-06062019-1115am/ohio-ag-law-blog-wotus-
lawsuits-continue-trickle-through-federal-courts [https://perma.cc/X4Z2-A6T3].
64. Gatz, supra note 10.
65. Perek, supra note 9.
66. Executive Order, supra note 59.
67. New Rule, supra note 9.
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176 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
II. THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION FRAMEWORK
The development of the WOTUS rule contains several notable
analytical parallels to the United States’ personal jurisdiction precedent.
In order to more fully understand the lessons that can be extracted from
this jurisprudence, the foundational personal jurisdiction cases require a
general presentation. These cases include International Shoe Company v.
Washington, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, Hanson v. Denckla, 
Asahi Metal Industry vs. Superior Court of California, and others.68 
A. Pennoyer, International Shoe, and Minimum Contacts
Personal jurisdiction is one of the foundational topics of American
legal jurisprudence. The concept is historically rooted in Pennoyer v. Neff, 
which established in 1878 that personal jurisdiction exists where the court
has power over the defendant’s person.69 In Pennoyer, defendant Neff was
sued by his lawyer Mitchell in Oregon for unpaid legal fees.70 Although
he owned 300 acres of land in Oregon, Neff was not a resident of Oregon
and was not served with process in Oregon.71 After the court entered a
default judgment against Neff, Mitchell took control of Neff’s land in
Oregon and sold it to Pennoyer in order to recover the fees that he sought.72 
Upon discovering what had happened, Neff sued Pennoyer to recover his
land.73 The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether the
default judgment against Neff was valid, given that he did not reside in
Oregon and was not served with process therein.74 The Court held that the 
default judgment was invalid because a state cannot exercise jurisdictional
authority over persons or property that are not within its borders.75 The
Pennoyer decision focused on the territorial limits of jurisdiction.
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court developed this idea further
in the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.76 The Missouri-based
International Shoe Company (International Shoe), incorporated in
68. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
69. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
70. Id. at 719.
71. Id. at 719–20.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 721–22.
75. Id. at 723.
76. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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1772021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
Delaware, employed salesmen to market its products in the state of
Washington.77 Washington sued International Shoe for failing to
contribute to a mandatory state unemployment fund.78 The state served 
both the salesmen personally in Washington and the Missouri
headquarters via mail.79 International Shoe argued that the state of
Washington did not have personal jurisdiction over it.80 The United States
Supreme Court held that International Shoe was subject to personal
jurisdiction in Washington because the company had minimum contacts
with Washington “such that the maintenance of the suit [did] not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”81 The Court noted
that although isolated acts by a salesman would likely not have created
jurisdiction, the extended nature of the salesmen’s presence in Washington
supported jurisdiction.82 The majority stated that since International Shoe
enjoyed the “benefits and protection” of doing business in Washington, it
is reasonable that it should also be subject to certain obligations therein.83 
The International Shoe majority introduced the idea that a party may
be subject to personal jurisdiction in a state, despite not being physically
headquartered in that state, as long as it has “minimum contacts” with the
state.84 The majority held that contacts that were “continuous and
systematic” were especially likely to lead to personal jurisdiction.85 The
International Shoe dissent, however, took a narrower approach, arguing
that the majority’s expansive approach infringed on states’ right to conduct
their own proceedings.86 
B. Hanson and Purposeful Availment
The Supreme Court had another opportunity to address personal
jurisdiction in the 1958 case of Hanson v. Denckla, in which the Court had
to decide whether the state of Florida had jurisdiction over a Delaware
trust.87 Hanson was the executor of her mother’s trust, which had been
77. Id. at 311–12.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 312.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
82. Id. at 319.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463).
85. Id. at 320.
86. Id. at 325.
87. See generally Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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178 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
established in Delaware before her mother moved to Florida.88 After 
moving to Florida, Hanson’s mother amended her will so that the majority
of the trust assets went to Hanson, not Hanson’s sisters Denckla and
Stewart.89 Following their mother’s passing, Denckla and Stewart sued in 
Florida, requesting that Florida exercise jurisdiction over the Delaware
trust and reinstate their previous shares of the trust.90 Hanson instituted an
action in Delaware, seeking validation of Delaware’s jurisdiction over the
trust.91 The United States Supreme Court held that Florida did not have
jurisdiction over the Delaware trust because Hanson did not have
minimum contacts with Florida.92 Justice Warren’s majority opinion noted 
that Hanson had not “purposefully avail[ed] [herself] of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws.”93 Justice Black’s dissent argued that the
Florida court should have been able to adjudicate the controversy because
of the Delaware trust’s regular and extended communications with
Hanson’s mother during her residence in Florida.94 He determined that
these communications, as well as Florida’s resultant interest in the proper
administration of the trust, created minimum contacts between the trust
and the state of Florida.95 
C. World-Wide Volkswagen, Shaffer, and Foreseeability
The increasing prevalence of cross-border travel in the twentieth
century was the impetus for the 1980 case of World-Wide Volkswagen
Corporation v. Woodson.96 In this case, the Robinson family purchased a
car in their home state of New York. While driving through Oklahoma,
they were involved in a serious car accident in which multiple family
members were severely burned.97 The Robinsons sued the New York
retailer and the New York-based manufacturer World-Wide Volkswagen
in Oklahoma.98 World-Wide Volkswagen objected that it was not subject
88. Id. at 238–39.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 240.
91. Id. at 242.
92. Id. at 253.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 258–59.
95. Id.
96. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980).
97. Id. at 288.
98. Id.
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1792021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
to jurisdiction in Oklahoma.99 The United States Supreme Court held that
there was no personal jurisdiction over World-Wide Volkswagen in
Oklahoma.100 Channeling International Shoe, the Court held that
Oklahoma could only have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant like World-Wide Volkswagen if the company had minimum
contacts with the state of Oklahoma.101 The Court explained that its 
decision was also based on an evaluation of several factors, including the
burden on the defendant, the interest of the state in question, and the
interest of the judicial system in an efficient resolution.102 
The Court utilized the concept of foreseeability to further develop its
point.103 World-Wide Volkswagen was not subject to jurisdiction because
it could not reasonably have foreseen or anticipated being called into court
in Oklahoma.104 Justice White, speaking for the majority, argued that
subjecting World-Wide Volkswagen to jurisdiction in Oklahoma would
create an unprecedented and unforeseeable level of liability for retailers
because their liability would travel with the items they sold.105 
Justice Marshall’s dissent, however, echoed the International Shoe
majority’s use of the “traditional notions of fair play” and argued that
World-Wide Volkswagen was subject to jurisdiction in Oklahoma.106 He 
viewed the majority’s decision as too narrow and dismissed its use of the
foreseeability concept.107 Justice Marshall felt that while World-Wide
Volkswagen may not have specifically predicted that its cars would end
up in Oklahoma, its participation in a regional and national economic
network implied that it should have expected such an occurrence in a
distant state.108 
Only a few years earlier, the Supreme Court decided in Shaffer v.
Heitner that a nonresident shareholders’ stock in an Arizona company did
not create the minimum contacts necessary for jurisdiction.109 In Shaffer, 
a nonresident shareholder sued the other nonresident shareholders, all of
whom owned stock in an Arizona company that was incorporated in
99. Id.
100. Id. at 299.
101. Id. (stating that World-Wide Volkswagen did not have sufficient contacts 
with the state of Oklahoma).
102. Id. at 292.
103. Id. at 295–97.
104. Id. at 287.
105. Id. at 296.
106. Id. at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 315 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215–16 (1977).
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180 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
Delaware.110 The issue was whether Delaware had jurisdiction over the
group of nonresident shareholders being sued.111 The Supreme Court held
in a majority opinion written by Justice Marshall that the shareholders
were not subject to jurisdiction in Delaware—despite the fact that the
company was incorporated in Delaware—because their shares in the
company were not sufficient to create minimum contacts.112 This was 
because the existence of the stocks did not lead to the inference that the
shareholders could be subject to a lawsuit in either Arizona or Delaware.113 
The majority reasoned that the nonresident shareholders had not
purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities
in Delaware.114 The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, would have held
that the shareholders were subject to jurisdiction in Delaware because of
the state’s powerful interest in ensuring the availability of a convenient
forum.115 
D. Asahi, McIntyre, and Intentional Targeting
The Supreme Court had several other opportunities to examine the
kinds of jurisdictional questions that were presented in World-Wide 
Volkswagen. Once such opportunity came in the 1987 case of Asahi Metal
Industry vs. Superior Court of California, in which the Court had to decide 
whether or not Asia-based manufacturer Asahi Metal Industry, which sold
materials to a California retailer, was subject to personal jurisdiction in
California for an automobile accident that had occurred there.116 The 
Supreme Court held unanimously that Asahi was not subject to jurisdiction
in California because it had not purposefully or intentionally directed its
actions toward California.117 However, the Court split evenly on the
rationale.118 Justice O’Connor wrote for the plurality that simply putting a
product into the stream of commerce is not enough to establish purposeful
110. Id. at 189–90.
111. Id. at 189.
112. Id. at 215–16.
113. Id. at 216.
114. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
115. Id. at 222 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
116. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 108
(1987).
117. Id. at 112. “The ‘substantial connection’ . . . between the defendant and
the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by
an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id.
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 102.
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1812021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
action toward the state at issue.119 There must be some sort of purposeful
physical action in the state for jurisdiction to be proper.120 O’Connor noted
that if Asahi had, for instance, designed the product for use in California
or advertised in California, minimum contacts might have been
established.121 O’Connor concluded by examining the factors laid out in
World-Wide Volkswagen, which made it clear that asserting jurisdiction 
over Asahi in California would be unreasonable.122 
Justice Brennan’s opinion argued that Asahi’s extensive sales
presence in California was enough to create minimum contacts with that
state.123 As long as Asahi was aware that its product was being marketed 
in California, “the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise.”124 If Asahi placed its goods in the stream of commerce with the
knowledge that they could eventually end up in California, minimum 
contacts existed and jurisdiction was proper.125 In the vein of International
Shoe, Brennan argued that a company who benefits economically from the 
state in question should be subject to jurisdiction there since those benefits
accrue regardless of whether or not the company intentionally targeted that
state.126 His approach focused on the ability of the state to regulate
individuals or entities who cause harm in that state, regardless of whether
or not they physically do anything in the state.
Likewise, in J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, the United States
Supreme Court held that a British company was not subject to jurisdiction
in New Jersey for a work accident that occurred in New Jersey because it
had not targeted the state of New Jersey.127 Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion noted that McIntyre had no offices in New Jersey, it did not pay
taxes in New Jersey, and it did not advertise in New Jersey.128 Therefore, 
McIntyre did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of doing business
in New Jersey and should not be subject to jurisdiction there.129 Kennedy
119. Id. at 112.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 112-14.
122. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980); see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
123. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (arguing that “Asahi’s regular and extensive
sales of component parts” in California was sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction 
there) (Brennan, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 877.
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182 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
also reaffirmed the view of the Asahi plurality that the mere possibility
that one’s goods might end up in the forum state is not enough to establish
jurisdiction.130 Justice Breyer’s concurrence agreed that a determination of
jurisdiction in New Jersey would subject far too many entities to
jurisdiction.131 However, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent argued that McIntyre 
was subject to the jurisdiction of New Jersey because it targeted the
broader market of the United States as a whole.132 
The cases described above provide a useful analytical device for
thinking about the “waters of the United States” definition. A closer look
at the ideological themes in the foregoing opinions is necessary in order to
understand the parallels that can inform a discussion of the WOTUS rule.
III. CLEAR CONNECTION, NOT SIGNIFICANT NEXUS
The United States’ personal jurisdiction precedent offers a helpful
framework through which to analyze the WOTUS rule. From the
foregoing cases can be drawn two distinct jurisprudential themes. One is
a broad, expansive view of jurisdiction that looks at the possibility of a
product making its way to the forum state.133 The other is a narrower view 
that looks at whether the party purposefully targeted the forum state.134 
A. Extracting Themes From the Personal Jurisdiction Precedent and 
Comparing Them to the Rapanos Opinions 
A careful analysis of the personal jurisdiction precedent discussed
above displays a clearly delineated set of themes. The first of these themes
is a broad, expansive approach that focuses on the possibility that the good
in question might eventually cause harm in the forum state. If such a
possibility exists, then jurisdiction is acceptable. This approach focuses on
a state’s ability to hold a nonresident liable for harm that they cause in the
forum state, regardless of whether they physically acted in the state. It is 
not concerned with the physicality or traceability of the connection. 
Instead, it maintains that even an indirect connection between the
defendant and the forum state can be sufficient for establishing
jurisdiction.
For instance, the International Shoe majority’s holding that
International Shoe was subject to jurisdiction in Washington was based on
130. Id. at 882.
131. Id. at 891 (Breyer, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
134. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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1832021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
an expansive interpretation of “minimum contacts.”135 The majority 
focused on International Shoe’s implied investment in the Washington
economy because it had enjoyed the benefit of doing business there.136 
This viewpoint emerged again in the World-Wide Volkswagen dissent.137 
Justice Marshall argued that the majority’s decision was too narrow and
that World-Wide Volkswagen’s participation in a regional and national
economic network implied that it should have expected to be sued in a 
distant state.138 Likewise, Justice Black adopted an expansive conception
of minimum contacts in Hanson when he argued that the Delaware trust’s
regular communications with Hanson’s mother during her residence in
Florida were enough to establish minimum contacts.139 Justice Brennan’s
dissent in Asahi also echoed this approach.140 He argued that all Asahi 
would need to do to be subject to jurisdiction in California was to simply
put its products in the broader stream of commerce.141 This approach
basically focused on whether or not Asahi made its products available and
had the knowledge that they might eventually end up in California.142 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in McIntyre likewise argued that McIntyre
would be subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey if it simply put its products
in the stream of commerce with the knowledge that they might eventually
end up in New Jersey.143 
The other approach is a narrower one that focuses on whether or not
the entity in question intentionally targeted the forum state. This approach
is all about physicality, intentionality, and purpose. Without a clear and
purposeful targeting of the forum state, jurisdiction is not appropriate. This
viewpoint requires a direct connection between the defendant and the
forum state in order for jurisdiction to exist. By focusing on the tangible
and traceable nature of the connection, the narrow viewpoint concerns
itself with individuals’ ability to control whether they are subject to
135. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
136. Id. at 319.
137. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 318–19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 121
(1987) (Brennan, J. concurring).
141. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J. concurring) (arguing that as Asahi was aware that 
its product was being marketed in California, “the possibility of a lawsuit there
cannot come as a surprise”).
142. Id.
143. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 546 U.S. 873, 905 (2011) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
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184 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction, from this perspective, is about how to 
appropriately limit state power. This viewpoint emerged initially in
Pennoyer v. Neff, which focused on the territorial limits of jurisdictional
power and held that a state cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person who
does not reside in that state and who was not properly served with process
in that state.144 The narrow approach was reiterated in International Shoe, 
where the dissenting opinion highlighted the dangers of an expansive
approach in relation to federalism and state autonomy.145 The Hanson
Court held that jurisdiction exists only when the party in question
“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”146 
The World-Wide Volkswagen majority also utilized this approach when it
held that World-Wide Volkswagen was not subject to jurisdiction in
Oklahoma.147 After considering a variety of factors, the Court decided that
World-Wide Volkswagen was not subject to jurisdiction because it could
not reasonably have foreseen or anticipated being called into court in
Oklahoma.148 Likewise, the Court held in Shaffer that nonresident
shareholders’ stock in an Arizona company did not create the minimum
contacts necessary for jurisdiction in Delaware (the state of incorporation)
because those shares did not lead to the inference that the shareholders
could be subject to a lawsuit in either Arizona or Delaware.149 In addition,
the Court noted that the shareholders had not purposefully availed
themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Delaware.150 The 
narrow viewpoint resurfaced in the Asahi majority opinion, where Justice
O’Connor stated that Asahi would have had to specifically target the state
of California with its products in order to be subject to jurisdiction in
California.151 The McIntyre majority also utilized this approach when it
held that McIntyre Machinery was not subject to jurisdiction in New
Jersey because it had not intentionally targeted that state.152 
In sum, the personal jurisdiction precedent contains two distinct
viewpoints: one that bases jurisdiction on a direct, obvious, and purposeful
targeting of the state and another that bases jurisdiction on utilizing the
144. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878).
145. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325 (1945).
146. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
147. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980).
148. Id. at 297.
149. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215–16 (1977).
150. Id. (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
151. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987).
152. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011).
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1852021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
stream of commerce and the possibility that the good in question might
eventually cause harm in the forum state.
These two approaches find intriguing parallels in the Rapanos opinion 
that informs much of the current law regarding the WOTUS definition.
Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos focuses on whether there is a clear,
continuous, and traceable connection between the body of water in
question and a traditionally navigable (and therefore clearly regulatable)
water.153 In other words, his opinion focuses on whether there is a clear,
targeted, and obvious connection. By focusing on the physicality of the
connection and requiring a direct connection between the defendant and
the forum state, it provides individuals with the additional freedom to
control whether or not they are subject to jurisdiction. This viewpoint
focuses on limiting governmental power and promoting fairness to
individuals.
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos opinion focuses
broadly on whether there is a “significant nexus” between the body of
water in question and a traditionally navigable (and therefore clearly
regulatable) water.154 His opinion focuses on whether there is at least some
chance that the water in question could eventually affect the larger breadth
of regulatable waters. Just like Justice Marshall’s dissent in World-Wide 
Volkswagen,155 even an indirect connection between the defendant and the 
forum state can be enough to establish jurisdiction. Kennedy’s viewpoint
is concerned with a state’s ability to hold individuals accountable for the
harm they cause to a state’s waters, regardless of where they physically
are when they cause that harm. Rather than focus on individuals’ ability to
determine where they are subject to liability, Justice Kennedy’s approach
focuses on the government’s ability to pursue remedies for harm done to
a body of water. In a sense, the two viewpoints in Rapanos embody the 
principles and ideologies that undergird the jurisdictional battles of the 
past century.
B. Implications From These Parallels
Justice Scalia opined in Rapanos that the ambiguity and vagueness of
the “significant nexus” test has effectively authorized a “‘Land is Waters’
153. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 717 (2006) (plurality opinion)
(noting that “only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies
that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right” are “adjacent” to other
regulated waters and therefore covered by the CWA).
154. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
155. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 314 (1980).
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186 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
approach to federal jurisdiction.”156 In saying this, Scalia expressed the
debate over the WOTUS rule in terms of federal jurisdiction, perhaps
drawing on the intrastate considerations inherent in water use regulation.
This idea—that the varying standards for the WOTUS definition can be
conceptualized through the lens of jurisdiction—is the basis for the
arguments that follow.
1. The Inherent Ambiguity of the Significant Nexus Test Makes It
Susceptible to Agency Overreach
The personal jurisdiction precedent described above suggests that the
narrower, more restrained approach is the proper way to interpret the
phrase “waters of the United States” because it avoids subjecting far too
many bodies of water to CWA jurisdiction. This is particularly relevant
because of Congress’ failure to delineate the WOTUS parameters, leaving
the definition process up to the Corps and the EPA.157 
The “significant nexus” test is based on whether the body of water
“significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of
a navigable water.158 However, if the body of water has only a minimal or
“speculative” impact on a navigable water, it is not a WOTUS.159 The 
ambiguity of this approach is ripe with the possibility of misuse by
agencies.160 For instance, what is the standard of chemical, physical, or
biological integrity that this should be measured against? 161 Under this
156. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 733–34 (plurality opinion) (noting that the agencies 
have “stretched the term ‘waters of the United States’ beyond parody”).
157. See Schilling, supra note 11, at 134 (“Whether intentional or not,
Congress's failure to elaborate and amend the definition and has left the task to
government experts like the Army Corps and the EPA.”).
158. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 722 (plurality opinion) (“Any plot of land containing such a channel
may potentially be regulated as a ‘water of the United States.’”); see also id. at
738 (“The extensive federal jurisdiction urged by the Government would
authorize the Corps to function as a de facto regulator of immense stretches of
intrastate land—an authority the agency has shown its willingness to exercise with
the scope of discretion that would befit a local zoning board. We ordinarily expect
a ‘clear and manifest’ statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented
intrusion into traditional state authority. The phrase ‘the waters of the United
States’ hardly qualifies.”) (internal citations omitted).
161. Id. at 756, n.15 (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted) (“Justice
Kennedy’s ‘significant nexus’ standard is perfectly opaque. When, exactly, does
a wetland ‘significantly affect’ covered waters . . . ? As the dissent hopefully
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1872021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
standard, one could argue that nearly any body of water—even a mere
puddle—affects the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of a
navigable water. Are any one of those three categories more important
than the others? How much of an effect constitutes a “significant”
effect?162 These are just a few of the questions that arise when considering
the lack of clarity associated with the “significant nexus” test.163 Chief
Justice John Roberts observed in the wake of Rapanos that the ambiguity
and uncertainty created by the case would lead to widespread confusion.164 
His prediction has unfortunately been borne out in both the agencies and
the courts, which have consistently struggled to find clarity in the
“significant nexus” test.165 
Justice Marshall argued in World-Wide Volkswagen that all that was
necessary for jurisdiction was World-Wide Volkswagen’s placing of its
goods in the general stream of commerce.166 In other words, jurisdiction 
was based on whether one’s product might eventually cause harm in the
forum state. However, his colleagues were quick to expose the practical
weaknesses of his argument by noting the impossibility of predicting
observes, such an unverifiable standard is not likely to constrain an agency whose 
disregard for the statutory language has been so long manifested.”).
162. See Latham, supra note 4, at 15 (“[T]he significant nexus test is fraught
with uncertainty, both in terms of application and guidance, for those mired in the
current muck of wetland jurisdictional determinations after the Court’s inability
in Rapanos to fashion a clearly articulated majority view. That is, just what
constitutes the necessary significant nexus sufficient for either the Corps or EPA 
to assert jurisdiction over property owners’ wetlands?”).
163. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 728 (plurality opinion) (noting that even the most 
insubstantial hydrologic connection may be held to constitute a “significant 
nexus”); see also Latham, supra note 4, at 14 (“Justice Kennedy’s approach in
essence provides a map with no indication of where North, South, East or West is
located.”).
164. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“It is unfortunate
that no opinion commands a majority of the Court on precisely how to read
Congress’ limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act. Lower courts and regulated
entities now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.”).
165. U.S. v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex.
2006). The judge stated that Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test provided “no
guidance on how to implement its vague, subjective centerpiece. That is, exactly
what is ‘significant’ and how is ‘nexus’ determined?” Id. See also Donald J.
Kochan, Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come to Generate
Environmental Law Without Congress, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 323, 338 (2019)
(pointing out that “the EPA and Corps happily exploited the judicial uncertainty
of meaning by adopting a dramatically broad, new administrative definition of
WOTUS”).
166. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 314 (1980).
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188 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
whether the product might do so. For instance, Justice White devoted
several paragraphs to depicting the kinds of situations that could arise if
the expansive approach was utilized, noting that retailers would be under
excessive and unrealistic pressure to predict every potential mishap.167 
Justice O’Connor’s Asahi opinion discussed how only an obvious or
intentional action truly created jurisdiction because it aligned with the
interest of the state and the judiciary in minimizing burdens on the parties
and resolving disputes efficiently.168 Justice White argued for the majority
in World-Wide Volkswagen that subjecting World-Wide Volkswagen to 
jurisdiction would subject retailers to an unprecedented level of liability.169 
Justice Breyer likewise argued in McIntyre that a determination of
jurisdiction in New Jersey would subject far too many entities to
jurisdiction.170 Justice Scalia’s Rapanos opinion echoed these concerns
when he argued that the “significant nexus” test would enable the
government to characterize even the smallest trickle as a “water of the 
United States.”171 He argued that such an expansive standard would
effectively authorize the federal government to regulate “immense
stretches of intrastate land,” a task that typically belongs to the states in
the American federalist system.172 
These opinions display the serious practical risks associated with the
expansive viewpoint. The resurgence of this outlook in Justice Kennedy’s
Rapanos test should therefore be cause for concern. The “significant
nexus” approach extends the proper scope of governmental authority too
far. In the process, it tramples on the proper limits of state power, as
established and evidenced in the personal jurisdiction cases described
167. Id. at 296.
168. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114
(1987); see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
169. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980).
170. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 891 (2011) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
171. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006) (plurality opinion)
(“Any plot of land containing such a channel may potentially be regulated as a 
‘water of the United States.’”). Justice Scalia argued that such an expansive
standard would effectively authorize the federal government to regulate “immense
stretches of intrastate land,” a task that typically belongs to the states. “We 
ordinarily expect a ‘clear and manifest’ statement from Congress to authorize an
unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority. The phrase ‘the waters of
the United States’ hardly qualifies.” Id. at 738 (internal citations omitted). See 
also J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 880.
172. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738 (plurality opinion).
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1892021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
above, and the governing principles of the American legal system.173 Just
as the McIntyre majority was right to criticize International Shoe and its 
progeny for their use of vague and unworkable “freeform notions of
fairness,” so was Justice Scalia correct to criticize Justice Kennedy’s
creation and use of a vague, unworkable, and ambiguous regulatory 
standard.174 
Justice Kennedy in fact admits the flawed nature of his proposed test
in his Rapanos opinion, noting that the significant nexus standard “may
not align perfectly with the traditional extent of federal authority.”175 He
nonetheless forges ahead, even going so far as to state that when a
significant nexus is established, it would be acceptable “as a matter of
administrative convenience” to “presume” that any other relatively similar
bodies of water in that general region also have a significant nexus.176 This
is perhaps the most alarming assertion of them all. Justice Kennedy
apparently feels that the EPA and Corps can assume the existence of a
significant nexus if it is too inconvenient for them to actually examine the
body of water in question.
As if intending to prove the danger of such ambiguity, the courts have
continued to uphold the sweeping jurisdiction of the EPA and Corps under
this expansive approach.177 For example, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held in Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers that a wetland that was separated from a traditionally
navigable body of water by a seventy-foot-high berm and a maintenance
road nonetheless had a significant nexus to the regulated water.178 It is hard 
to imagine how almost anything could stop the courts or agencies from
finding a “significant nexus” if a seventy-foot-high berm is not enough.
Likewise, in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., the Corps 
173. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (“It will be of little avail to the
people . . . if the laws be . . . so incoherent that they cannot be understood . . . .
Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little
known, and less fixed?”).
174. J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 880 (“Freeform notions of fundamental fairness
divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the
absence of authority into law.”).
175. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
176. Id. (“Where an adequate nexus is established for a particular wetland, it
may be permissible, as a matter of administrative convenience or necessity, to
presume covered status for other comparable wetlands in the region.”).
177. Id. at 726 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he lower courts have continued to
uphold the Corps’ sweeping assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels
and drains as ‘tributaries.’”).
178. Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 425
F.3d 1150, 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005).
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190 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
argued that a wetland had a significant nexus to a regulated water that was
over 120 miles away.179 Although the Supreme Court did not decide
whether there was a significant nexus due to the procedural nature of the
case, the fact that the Corps felt able to make such a claim in the first place 
is concerning.
These judicial actions have only emboldened the agencies, who have
been quite pleased to utilize the full breadth of their authority under the
“significant nexus” interpretation.180 This has been particularly 
unfortunate for Americans who own or use large amounts of land, such as
farmers. For instance, Springfield, Illinois, farmer Kurt Wilke was sued
three times by the EPA and other agencies for allegedly filling in a wetland
on a farm that had been farmed for more than 100 years.181 The 
government never visited the site, but they nonetheless claimed that the
supposed wetland was a WOTUS.182 Similarly, the Corps sued California 
farmer John Duarte for plowing his own field.183 The government claimed
that seasonal water gatherings on certain parts of the land made it a
179. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016).
180. Arechiga, supra note 16, at 179 (noting that the regulatory framework has
quietly but steadily “expanded over time” to include more and more bodies of
water); Gorton, supra note 11, at 237 (noting that the process of “describing the
nation’s water resources has since caused problems and, consequently, resulted in
the expansion of federal environmental regulatory jurisdiction across the country.
It has also been a long-time source of considerable tension across the nation as
surprised citizens, industries, and organizations find that activities on their
properties are subject to federal regulation”).
181. Deana Stroich, Illinoisans Ask for Swampbuster Reform, 
FARMWEEKNOW.COM (July 16, 2018, updated Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.farm
weeknow.com/policy/national/illinoisans-ask-for-swampbuster-reform/article_b
d89f78a-d3d6-11e9-9de4-1f287ed64e20.html [https://perma.cc/S53Q-9R72]
(statement of Adam Nielsen, Ill. Farm Bureau) (“Everyone we met with quickly
recognized that if [Kurt Wilke] weren’t a lawyer and a farmer, NRCS and the 
appeals process would have buried him and wrongfully denied his family’s right
to farm land that should never have been in question.”).
182. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“Where
an adequate nexus is established for a particular wetland, it may be permissible,
as a matter of administrative convenience or necessity, to presume covered status
for other comparable wetlands in the region.”).
183. Robin Abcarian, A Land-Use Case That's Enough to Furrow a Farmer's
Brow, L.A. TIMES, (Jan. 15, 2016, 2:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/ab
carian/la-me-0115-abcarian-farmer-wetlands-20160115-column.html [https://per
ma.cc/YH67-C3QB].
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1912021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
regulatable water.184 This determination was only possible because of the 
ambiguous and amorphous nature of the definition of WOTUS, which
effectively allows agency officials to characterize almost anything as a
WOTUS.185 In addition, the EPA and Corps have spent over thirty years 
pursuing legal action against Pennsylvania farmer Robert Brace for
repairing drainage systems in his own fields, alleging that his actions were
causing discharges into a water of the United States even though the water
in question was a previously non-existent wetland that only formed
because of uncontrollable beaver activity.186 Likewise, the Corps sued
wheat farmer Jack LaPant for planting his own fields, claiming that they
were navigable waters under the definition of WOTUS.187 His wheat fields
constituted navigable waters because, according to the Corps, they
contained several small depressions in which seasonal rainfall sometimes
gathered.188 These sobering stories are only a few examples of the
regulatory overreach that has resulted from an ambiguous and unduly
broad interpretation of the phrase “waters of the United States.”
2. The Significant Nexus Test Has No Basis in Either the CWA or 
Precedent
The “significant nexus” test has no basis in precedent, nor is it
supported by the text of the CWA. First, Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” test, which has since become the basis for the EPA and Corps’
enforcement of the WOTUS definition, was not actually a CWA
184. Bennett, supra note 3 (“Twenty years of wheat production followed by
15 years of livestock production wasn’t a continuous farming operation, according
to DOJ.”).
185. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 722 (plurality opinion).
186. See generally United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
ECOSTRATEGIES CIVIL ENG’G, WETLAND EVALUATION REPORT 3 (2015),
http://nebula.wsimg.com/658771222d0cf5edb63033181395d3a6?AccessKeyId= 
7F494AADE6AF42D36823&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 [https://perma.cc/V
Q8Q-FE2S] (noting that agency interference was actually one of the primary
causes of the creation of wetland conditions because they did not allow Brace to
maintain the ditches).
187. See Tony Francois, Trump’s New “Navigable Waters” Rule is an
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192 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
requirement.189 In fact, that language does not even appear in the Act.190 
Justice Scalia rightly called Justice Kennedy out for attempting to rewrite
the statute on his own by picking and choosing from among the CWA’s
stated purposes and creating something that Congress did not.191 
Second, the Supreme Court precedent regarding the WOTUS 
definition does not support the application of the expansive “significant
nexus” test.192 As discussed above, the Court held in Solid Waste Agency
of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that the CWA
did not extend to a group of wetlands that the agency was trying to build
on because they were isolated, individual bodies of water that were not
directly connected to a navigable water.193 Likewise, the Supreme Court
decided in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. that the
definition of “waters of the United States” included only those waters that
“actually abut[ted]” a traditionally navigable water.194 Both of these cases
directly counter the “significant nexus” test.
Third, a glance at the personal jurisdiction precedent shows that an
even broader swath of Supreme Court jurisprudence does not support the
“significant nexus” formulation.195 Hanson established that jurisdiction 
189. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 754–55 (plurality opinion).
190. Id. (“In fact, however, that phrase appears nowhere in the Act, but is taken
from SWANCC’s cryptic characterization of the holding of Riverside Bayview.”). 
Scalia later criticized Kennedy for substituting his own view of the CWA for
Congress’ view of the CWA using a “Dog Didn’t Bark” argument. In other words,
Congress could have inserted a “significant nexus” requirement, but it didn’t.
191. Id. at 756 (“More fundamentally, however, the test simply rewrites the
statute, using for that purpose the gimmick of ‘significant nexus.’ It would have
been an easy matter for Congress to give the Corps jurisdiction over all wetlands
(or, for that matter, all dry lands) that ‘significantly affect the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of’ waters of the United States. It did not do that, but
instead explicitly limited jurisdiction to ‘waters of the United States.’”); see also
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 22 (1998) (“[J]udges have no authority . . . to write . . . new laws”).
192. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001) (holding that the CWA did not extend to the waters
in question because they were isolated, individual bodies of water that were not 
directly connected to a navigable water).
193. Id.
194. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135
(1985).
195. Id.; Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 171–72; Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215–16 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980);
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987); J.
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1932021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
exists only where the party in question “purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.”196 World-Wide Volkswagen was not
subject to jurisdiction in Oklahoma because it could not reasonably have
foreseen or anticipated being called into court in Oklahoma. 197 The 
Supreme Court held in Shaffer that nonresident shareholders’ stock in an
Arizona company did not create the minimum contacts necessary for
jurisdiction in Delaware (the state of incorporation) because those shares
did not lead to the inference that the shareholders could be subject to a
lawsuit in either Arizona or Delaware.198 Justice O’Connor held that Asahi
Metal Industry would have had to specifically target the state of California
with its products in order to be subject to jurisdiction in California.199 
McIntyre Machinery was not subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey because
it had not intentionally targeted that state.200 All of these descriptors— 
intentionality, obvious and purposeful action, clear targeting of the forum
state, etc.—are saying the same thing: a clear, direct, and obvious
connection is required in order to avoid subjecting too many parties to
jurisdiction. When paralleled with the WOTUS context, the correctness of
Scalia’s standard is reinforced. Requiring a clear, direct, and obvious
connection is necessary in order to avoid subjecting too many waters (and
therefore too many American landowners) to excessive regulation.
The reasoning above makes it clear that Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” standard, which is the basis for the CWA’s WOTUS definition, is
vague, dangerously ambiguous, and ripe for regulatory overreach. The
past few decades have witnessed the EPA and Corps’ incremental
expansion of their control over landowners (particularly farmers) through
the use of the WOTUS rule.201 Therefore, the Trump administration was
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011); Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 316 (1945).
196. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
197. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297.
198. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215–16.
199. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
200. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 886.
201. United States v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (N.D. Fla. 1993)
(referring to “the disturbing implications of the expansive jurisdiction which has 
been assumed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean
Water Act,” which the court characterized as a “regulatory hydra”); United States
v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994); Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 425 F.3d 1150, 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005); Abcarian,
supra note 183; Stroich, supra note 181 (statement of Adam Nielsen, Ill. Farm
Bureau); Kogan, supra note 7.
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194 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
correct to discard the “significant nexus” test and utilize Justice Scalia’s
“clear connection” test.202 This test focuses on whether there is a direct, 
continuous, and traceable connection between the body of water in 
question and a traditionally navigable water.203 It is preferable because it
avoids the ambiguity associated with the current standard, minimizes the
opportunity for abuse by agency officials, and provides clarity to farmers
and other landowners.204 
C. Responding to Anticipated Objections
In anticipation of possible objections to these conclusions, this Section
provides both a summary of three potential counterarguments and
reasoned responses for each.
1. Objection #1: A Faulty Parallel
Some may object that the parallels drawn between the personal
jurisdiction precedent and the two WOTUS viewpoints are inadequate.
This is a fair point. Like any cross-disciplinary comparison, this set of
parallels does not provide a direct analogy in every single respect. The 
primary difference is that the personal jurisdiction precedent is concerned
with the ability of courts to exercise power over an individual, whereas the
WOTUS definition and the CWA in general are about the ability of the
federal government to exercise power over an individual. In other words,
interpreting the WOTUS definition depends in part on a discussion of
Congressional intent and the drafters’ understanding of the CWA, but the 
personal jurisdiction cases depend on courts’ interpretations of the limits 
of Due Process. While these differences are no doubt important to
recognize, the parallels drawn herein are nonetheless valid. The judicial
conceptualization of personal jurisdiction is easily adaptable to the
governmental context of the CWA.205 Both are concerned with the proper
202. New Rule, supra note 9.
203. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 717 (plurality opinion).
204. Latham, supra note 4, at 13–14 (noting that Justice Scalia’s “jurisdictional
requirement of the presence of water does have the appeal of clarity”).
205. This kind of parallel legal application has been done many times before.
For instance, the Supreme Court has regularly applied the “presumption of
regularity” associated with claims of governmental failure to comply with
required procedures to the executive branch and its agencies, among others. See 
United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926) (describing the
presumption); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989); Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933).
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  199 2/25/21  8:41 AM











   
  







   
  
   





       
    








   
 
     
  
 
1952021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
limits of the statute and the proper implementation of due process. Both
are inquiring about the ability of the individual to avoid institutional
power. Both are asking essentially the same question: When is an
individual subject to legal authority?
In addition, even if one were to disregard the personal jurisdiction
parallels and approach this discussion solely from the perspective of
Congressional intent, the “clear connection” test would still emerge as the
best option. This is because the Congressional intent question would
transform this article’s inquiry into a question of statutory interpretation
to which the canons of statutory construction must be applied, and those
canons favor the “clear connection” test. In particular, the Avoidance
Canon and the Whole Act Approach both support the adoption of the
“clear connection” test.
First, the Avoidance Canon states that, when possible, courts will
interpret statutes so as to avoid serious constitutional difficulties.206 The 
threshold question for purposes of this discussion is whether the
“significant nexus” test would lead to serious Constitutional difficulties.207 
The answer is a resounding “yes”: There are multiple constitutional
difficulties associated with the “significant nexus” test. For instance, the
inherent ambiguity of the “significant nexus” test leads to widespread Due
Process concerns because agency officials have been very willing to
interpret almost anything as a “significant nexus.”208 The cases described 
above, in which multiple farmers were rendered helpless in the face of
206. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 859 (2012) (“Avoidance Canon: avoid
interpretations that would render a statute unconstitutional or that would raise
serious constitutional difficulties.”). While some see the Avoidance Canon as a 
mere presumption that should be invoked only “when fairly possible to do so,”
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932), the United States Supreme Court has, 
on multiple occasions, utilized this canon to resolve important issues. See, e.g.,
United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957) (holding that interpreting
the statute to allow very broad questioning of detainees would lead to
constitutional difficulties); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490,
507 (1979) (holding that church-school teachers are not required to comply with
National Labor Relations Act because doing so would raise serious Constitutional 
difficulties).
207. NLRB, 440 U.S. at 501 (noting the importance of avoiding “serious
constitutional questions”).
208. United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994); Baccarat Fremont
Developers, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 425 F.3d 1150, 1152, 1157 (9th
Cir. 2005).
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196 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
regulatory action, are a prime example of these Due Process concerns.209 
The Brace case is a particularly pointed example, as he was sued based on
factors that were both (1) completely out of his control and (2) created by
the agencies’ own actions.210 
The “significant nexus” test would also lead to constitutional
difficulties because it endangers the federalist principles that undergird the
American republic. Justice Scalia’s Rapanos opinion lists this very 
concern as one of the four primary reasons that the “clear connection” test
should be adopted.211 He maintained that the Corps’ excessively broad
WOTUS definition would infringe upon the power of the states to control
their land and water usage.212 In this case, there was no “clear and
manifest” statement from Congress that would authorize such an
infringement of state authority.213 As the Supreme Court stated in Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, 214 there is a presumption against federal preemption of states’
ability to regulate their own affairs.215 The “significant nexus” test would
allow agencies (and, to a lesser degree, courts) to override this
presumption and violate the foundational principles of federalism.
Secondly, the Whole Act Approach suggests that the “clear
connection” test is the preferable approach to the WOTUS definition.
Under this approach, courts will interpret one part of a statute based on
other parts of the same statute based on a presumption of statutory
consistency.216 Scalia’s Rapanos opinion addressed this argument when he
209. Brace, 41 F.3d 117; Baccarat Fremont Developers, 425 F.3d at 1152,
1157; Abcarian, supra note 183; Bennett, supra note 3; Stroich, supra note 181.
210. ECOSTRATEGIES CIVIL ENG’G, supra note 186, at 3.
211. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731 (2006) (plurality opinion).
212. Id. at 737–38 (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)).
213. Id. (“We ordinarily expect a ‘clear and manifest’ statement from
Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state 
authority.”).
214. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) (holding that judge
age requirements are to be set by each state, even though the federal government
has a statute that limits the age of judges, because it is vitally important to preserve
the rights guaranteed to the states and removed from the control of the federal 
government).
215. It is also worth noting that the Ashcroft presumption directly supports this
Article’s use of the personal jurisdiction precedent in support of the “clear
connection” test. Jurisdictional questions revolve around inter-state activity,
which implicates the very state-sovereignty questions that concerned the Ashcroft 
court.
216. See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is
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1972021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
stated that other areas of the CWA provide additional support for the “clear
connection” test.217 As noted above, the CWA defines intermittent and
infrequent flows of water under the “point sources” portion of the statute, 
not the “navigable waters” portion.218 In addition, the phrase “navigable
waters,” which was adopted from previous versions of the CWA and is the
umbrella section under which the WOTUS definition sits, has traditionally
been understood to only include discrete bodies of water.219 If an 
overarching term refers only to a limited set of discrete bodies of water, it
is quite strange to simultaneously argue that its sub-term refers to a broad
and undefined array of non-discrete bodies of water.220 Therefore, both the 
overall placement of the WOTUS definition in the statute’s structure and
the broader term within which it resides support a narrow reading.221 In
addition to the strong support for the “clear connection” test in the CWA,
there is also a notable lack of support for Justice Kennedy’s broad
“significant nexus” reading. In fact, the “significant nexus” has never been
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme—because the same
terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or
because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that
is compatible with the rest of the law.”). The Supreme Court has utilized this
approach regularly. For instance, both the majority and the dissenting opinions in
Babbitt v. Sweet Home used the Whole Act Approach to make distinct arguments.
See generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 
687 (1995). In holding that habitat modifications such as logging constituted an
illegal taking of an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
the majority argued that a 1982 Amendment to the ESA showed that the act as a
whole was meant to broadly protect species. See id. at 702–03. The dissent, 
however, argued that other uses of the word “take” in the statute suggested that
the act as a whole did not provide such protections. See id. at 717 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
217. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731 (plurality opinion).
218. Id. at 735.
219. Id. at 734 (“In addition, the Act’s use of the traditional phrase ‘navigable
waters’ (the defined term) further confirms that it confers jurisdiction only over
relatively permanent bodies of water. The Act adopted that traditional term from
its predecessor statutes. On the traditional understanding, ‘navigable waters’
included only discrete bodies of water.”) (internal citations omitted).
220. United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962)) (“The ‘whole act’ rule of
statutory construction exhorts us to read a section of a statute not ‘in isolation
from the context of the whole Act’ but to ‘look to the provisions of the whole law,
and to its object and policy.’”).
221. Id.; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 734 (plurality opinion).
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198 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
a CWA requirement and does not appear anywhere in the Act, which
suggests that Justice Kennedy simply made it up.222 
Some may argue in return that the oft-invoked “Dog Didn’t Bark”
interpretive canon suggests that Congress’ failure to define WOTUS
suggests that its intent was to let the agencies define the term however they
liked.223 In other words, since no one in Congress brought up how to define
the term, Congress must have intended not to define it and—by 
implication—must have intended to let the agencies define it. However,
Congressional abdication of its legislative responsibility does not lead ipso
facto to the conclusion that any agency viewpoint is correct.224 To do so 
would be to inflict yet another grievous blow to the federalism principles
that the “significant nexus” test has already sorely wounded.225 While it is 
unfortunate that Congress did not provide guidance on how to define the
WOTUS term, it is certainly clear that any proposed definition of the
WOTUS term should align as closely as possible with the materials that
Congress did provide.226 This brings the issue right back to Scalia’s
Rapanos argument and the Whole Act analysis above.227 Since the
“significant nexus” test cannot be found anywhere else in the CWA and
222. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 755 (plurality opinion) (“In fact, however, that
phrase appears nowhere in the Act, but is taken from SWANCC’s cryptic 
characterization of the holding of Riverside Bayview.”). Scalia later criticized
Kennedy for substituting his own view of the CWA for Congress’ view.
223. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 206, at 859. (“The ‘dog didn’t bark’ canon:
presumption that prior legal rule should be retained if no one in legislative
deliberations even mentioned the rule or discussed any changes in the rule.”).
224. Kochan, supra note 165, at 329–30 (referring to the Congressional
tendency to “abdicat[e] lawmaking authority [and] supplant[] the Framers’
anticipated ambition to erect strong fences around their claim on exclusive 
legislative authority”).
225. Id.; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731 (plurality opinion) (arguing that the Corps’
excessively broad WOTUS definition would infringe upon the power of the states 
to control their land and water usage); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463
(1991).
226. See Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 236 n.5 (1991) (noting that
it is common practice to resort to “other . . . material[s] when required to interpret
a statute which is ambiguous . . . .”); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 
545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (stating that these other materials can “shed a reliable
light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms”).
227. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 734 (plurality opinion); see also United States v.
Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962)) (“The ‘whole act’ rule of statutory construction exhorts us
to read a section of a statute not ‘in isolation from the context of the whole Act’
but to ‘look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’”).
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  203 2/25/21  8:41 AM




   




   
  
    




    
  
 
    
  
   
 
     
   
  






      
   
    
    
     
     
       
        




1992021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
the “clear connection” test is supported by both the historical interpretation
of the WOTUS rule and the overall structure of the act, the goal of
interpreting the WOTUS definition based on what Congress did provide is
easily accomplished by adopting the “clear connection” test.
2. Objection #2: “Clear Connection” Is No Less Subjective Than 
“Significant Nexus”
Some may object that this factor test leads to just as much subjectivity
as the “significant nexus” standard. However, there are three reasons that
this objection is inaccurate. First, the “clear connection” approach would,
as noted above, maximize judicial efficiency. It would limit the number of
lawsuits that happen in the first place, thereby giving judges adequate time 
to devote themselves to a thorough examination of the cases. Second, this
approach provides an actual definition, not a vague concept whose
ambiguity and case-by-case (or perhaps judge-by-judge) variability make
it open to an almost endless number of interpretations.228 This definition
utilizes the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction precedent to create the
first step toward a more workable and just definition of the “waters of the
United States.”229 Third, the agencies would actually benefit from this
framework because it would provide them with clarity.230 This is
particularly relevant in light of Congress’ failure to delineate the WOTUS
228. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 756, n.15 (plurality opinion) (internal citations
omitted) (“Justice Kennedy’s ‘significant nexus’ standard is perfectly opaque.
When exactly does a wetland ‘significantly affect’ covered waters . . . ?”);
Latham, supra note 4 (“[T]he significant nexus test is fraught with uncertainty,
both in terms of application and guidance, for those mired in the current muck of
wetland jurisdictional determinations after the Court’s inability in Rapanos to 
fashion a clearly articulated majority view. That is, just what constitutes the
necessary significant nexus sufficient for either the Corps or EPA to assert
jurisdiction over property owners’ wetlands?”).
229. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135
(1985); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159, 171–72 (2001); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215–16 (1977);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873,
886 (2011); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 316 (1945).
230. See Scott Angstreich, Shoring up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock
Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 114– 
15 (2000) (“[A]s a regulation gets clearer, it is usually easier to enforce, thus
reducing the costs of applying the rule and increasing the incentive of regulated
entities to comply.”).
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200 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
parameters, leaving the definition process up to the agencies.231 Providing
this additional level of clarity would enable citizens to more clearly
anticipate when they might be subject to regulation. It would also ensure
that agencies face fewer complaints of overreach.
3. Objection #3: “Clear Connection” Would Create Inconsistency
and Injustice
Others may object that the agencies’ current approach is necessary in
order to avoid inconsistency. This argument might maintain that since the
agencies’ position is based on scientific evidence about the integrated
nature of the water supply, it is the most reasonable and most widely
applicable framework. The existence of a few occasional problems should
not mean that we ignore the agencies’ efforts to implement a
comprehensive regulatory regime. However, that is not the primary 
problem in the WOTUS context. The issues with the WOTUS definition
stem from ambiguous, vaguely drafted statutes and the regulatory
overreach that so naturally follows, not with the sincerity or good
intentions of agency officials. The cases described above are perfect
examples of the kinds of injustices that result from the inconsistency made
possible by the “significant nexus” standard.232 
Others may argue with Justice Kennedy that requiring a clear
connection would be unfair in practice because it would subject a small
yet constant trickle to jurisdiction while exempting an irregular torrent
through an otherwise dry channel.233 Kennedy focused particularly on 
man-made ditches and other industrial conduits as being prime examples
of intermittent water flows that very well could be substantial.234 However, 
while Scalia readily admits that many such conduits can hold water both
permanently and intermittently, he points to the fact that the CWA defines
“ditches” and “waters” in separate parts of the Act as indicative of
Congress’ intent to distinguish between continuous and intermittent flows
231. Schilling, supra note 11, at 134 (“Whether intentional or not, Congress's
failure to elaborate and amend the definition and has left the task to government
experts like the Army Corps and the EPA.”).
232. See United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994); Baccarat Fremont
Developers, LLC v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 425 F.3d 1150, 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.
2005); Abcarian, supra note 183; Bennett, supra note 3; Stroich, supra note 181.
233. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 728 (plurality opinion) (noting that “even the most
insubstantial hydrologic connection may be held to constitute a ‘significant
nexus.’”).
234. Id. at 777 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
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2012021] FROM ASAHI TO WOTUS
of water.235 He also observes that Kennedy is straying from the Court’s 
true goal in Rapanos, which was not to determine exactly when a particular
streambed becomes dry enough to lose its WOTUS status but rather to 
provide a reliable and workable framework for states and agencies.236 
Therefore, concerns about the clear connection test’s practical fairness do
not cast doubt on its validity.
CONCLUSION
This Article comes at a particularly relevant time. On September 12,
2019, the Trump administration rolled back the Obama-era WOTUS rule
and announced its plan to redefine the term.237 On January 23, 2020, the
administration replaced the 2015 rule with a revised rule that significantly
reduced the government’s reach in regulating the nation’s waterways.238 
This Article utilizes the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction
precedent to draw insightful parallels to the WOTUS context that strongly
support Scalia’s Rapanos interpretation and the Trump administration’s
revised WOTUS rule.239 It identifies the susceptibility of the WOTUS
definition to abuse and uncovers its lack of a legitimate statutory or
235. Id. at 736 n.7 (plurality opinion) (“On its only natural reading, such a
statute that treats ‘waters’ separately from ‘ditch[es], channel[s], tunnel[s], and
conduit[s],’ thereby distinguishes between continuously flowing ‘waters’ and
channels containing only an occasional or intermittent flow.”).
236. Id. at 732 n.5 (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted) (“By describing 
‘waters’ as ‘relatively permanent,’ we do not necessarily exclude streams, rivers, or
lakes that might dry up in extraordinary circumstances, such as drought. We also do 
not necessarily exclude seasonal rivers, which contain continuous flow during some
months of the year but no flow during dry months . . . . Though scientifically precise
distinctions between ‘perennial’ and ‘intermittent’ flows are no doubt available, we
have no occasion in this litigation to decide exactly when the drying up of a
streambed is continuous and frequent enough to disqualify the channel as a ‘wate[r]
of the United States.’ It suffices for present purposes that channels containing
permanent flow are plainly within the definition, and that the dissent’s ‘intermittent’
and ‘ephemeral’ streams . . . are not.”).
237. Perek, supra note 9.
238. New Rule, supra note 9 (laying out four categories of waters that are
considered waters of the United States: “(1) The territorial seas, and waters which
are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in
interstate or foreign commerce, including waters which are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide; (2) tributaries; (3) Lakes and ponds, and impoundments of
jurisdictional waters; and (4) Adjacent wetlands.”).
239. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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202 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
precedential basis.240 In light of the parallels drawn and problems 
identified, this Article argues that Justice Scalia’s “clear connection” test
is the better approach.241 In short, this Article provides additional support
for the new WOTUS definition at a highly relevant juncture.
The WOTUS definition has always been controversial.242 Scholars,
agencies, and courts continue to struggle with implementing its standards
and balancing the interests of competing parties.243 In an effort to calm the
murky waters of the WOTUS rule,244 this Article provides a timely and in-
depth analysis of the flaws in the current “significant nexus” test and
additional support for the adoption of the “clear connection” test in order
to help courts and agencies make better decisions and avoid burdening
landowners.
240. See discussion supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.2.
241. See discussion supra Part III.C.
242. Gatz, supra note 10; see also Kochan, supra note 165, at 340.
243. Gorton, supra note 11, at 242.
244. Revised Definition, supra note 62; Fact Sheet, supra note 62 (“The role
of federal government under the Clean Water Act is ultimately derived from
Congress’ commerce power over navigation. As a result, this proposal clearly
limits ‘waters of the United States’ under the Clean Water Act to those that are
physically and meaningfully connected to traditional navigable waters.”); Perek,
supra note 9.
